CALLBACK CALLBACK
From NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System�
Number 194
July 1995
Among the Mis-sing
Mis-understandings, mis-interpretations, mis communications—all can lead to a variety of adverse consequences. An ASRS report illustrates how a misunderstanding about IFR clearances led to an unauthorized flight into IMC.
■ Weather conditions were 1200 feet overcast, 4 miles visibility in fog, with tops at 3200 feet and visibilities 40+ miles on top. I was cleared for a descent from 4500 feet for a VOR approach into XYZ, and told to maintain VFR. The next Approach facility cleared me for the VOR approach. I flew the approach as published, and at the final approach fix, Approach told me to squawk VFR and switch to Advisory. I squawked 1200 even though I was in IMC conditions at the time. About 4 miles from XYZ and in VMC, I told Approach that I would like to cancel IFR and proceed VFR. At that time they told me that I was never IFR.
A clearance for an approach using a particular navaid does not qualify as an IFR clearance. The reporter could have picked up on two clues—first, the instruction to maintain VFR, and second, the VFR squawk.
Fowled
An instructor making a point to his student about forced landings was reminded of another important point—that of thorough pre-flight preparation, including a careful review of charts. The student, presented with a simulated engine failure, went through all the right steps for selecting a landing site and securing the aircraft in preparation for the landing, when...
Yikes!
A mid-air collision is many pilots’ worst nightmare. In the following report, classified as an incident, the pilots of both aircraft were very fortunate to have experienced a mid-air with such minimal consequences. The pilot of a low-wing aircraft had been informed of glider traffic at his airport of intended landing, but did not have the traffic in sight. The pilot switched to UNICOM, reported crossing overhead, and began his descent on crosswind.
■ ...at approximately 100 feet AGL, we initiated a goaround. Upon application of power, many birds took flight from the ground cover. No incident arose. However, this prompted me to consult my sectional and terminal area charts, and the location was verified as a National Wildlife Refuge. Always performing low altitude maneuvers [in this area] caused complacency in verifying compliance with airspace [regulations].
Flying daily in the Class B veil has taught me about airspace dimensions and locations, and ATC compliance and communication. Emphasis on these aspects caused me to overlook the airspace not specifically regulated by ATC or FAA regulations. Instructors are faced with a multitude of cockpit tasks, including setting a good example for the student. After this incident, the instructor reviewed his error with the student, and discussed the importance of interpreting chart symbology.
■ As I started to turn onto downwind, I felt a bump...as if the wheels struck an object. My wheel struck the glider’s canopy, and my right wing grazed the glider’s right wing. Both aircraft landed with minor damage.
Both glider pilots were looking for me. I could not see the glider beneath me turning onto downwind [at the same time I was]. I was not aware the glider was in the pattern. A Tower would have averted this incident, which was close to being a tragic accident. Actually, adherence to recommended safe operating procedures would have averted the incident. Descending to the traffic pattern altitude outside the normal pattern decreases the likelihood of descending onto another aircraft. In addition, the 45-degree entry to the downwind leg is helpful in sighting other aircraft in the pattern. In this incident, neither procedure was used.
Fouled Again
An instructor, highly experienced but low-time in type, found that being misinformed about one mechanical system led to several unpleasant surprises.
■ Training flight [at 2,000 feet MSL]. Slow flight. Dirty, then partial stall. The left engine quit when throttles retarded. Hydraulic pump is on that engine only. Therefore, flaps blew up but gear was stuck down. Barely made it back to airport on one engine. Five [attempted] restarts were un “suck”-cessful. Plugs were later found fouled...
This instructor also displayed questionable judgment in practicing stalls at 2,000 feet. A higher altitude is usually recommended and would have provided a safety buffer for stall training and practice of emergency procedures.
ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
Reported procedural problems with an ILS approach Allegedly defective cockpit seat latches on the B-737-500 Illegal Extended Range (ETOPS) routing of a jet by ATC Multiple electrical system malfunctions on a DC-10-10 Runaway rudder trim during takeoff of an Airbus 300-600R
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting
System,
P.O. Box 189,
Moffett Field, CA
94035-0189
May 1995 Report Intake
Air Carrier Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 1994 819 90 44
TOTAL
2947
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址:美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_194.pdf
From NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System�
Number 194
July 1995
Among the Mis-sing
Mis-understandings, mis-interpretations, mis communications—all can lead to a variety of adverse consequences. An ASRS report illustrates how a misunderstanding about IFR clearances led to an unauthorized flight into IMC.
■ Weather conditions were 1200 feet overcast, 4 miles visibility in fog, with tops at 3200 feet and visibilities 40+ miles on top. I was cleared for a descent from 4500 feet for a VOR approach into XYZ, and told to maintain VFR. The next Approach facility cleared me for the VOR approach. I flew the approach as published, and at the final approach fix, Approach told me to squawk VFR and switch to Advisory. I squawked 1200 even though I was in IMC conditions at the time. About 4 miles from XYZ and in VMC, I told Approach that I would like to cancel IFR and proceed VFR. At that time they told me that I was never IFR.
A clearance for an approach using a particular navaid does not qualify as an IFR clearance. The reporter could have picked up on two clues—first, the instruction to maintain VFR, and second, the VFR squawk.
Fowled
An instructor making a point to his student about forced landings was reminded of another important point—that of thorough pre-flight preparation, including a careful review of charts. The student, presented with a simulated engine failure, went through all the right steps for selecting a landing site and securing the aircraft in preparation for the landing, when...
Yikes!
A mid-air collision is many pilots’ worst nightmare. In the following report, classified as an incident, the pilots of both aircraft were very fortunate to have experienced a mid-air with such minimal consequences. The pilot of a low-wing aircraft had been informed of glider traffic at his airport of intended landing, but did not have the traffic in sight. The pilot switched to UNICOM, reported crossing overhead, and began his descent on crosswind.
■ ...at approximately 100 feet AGL, we initiated a goaround. Upon application of power, many birds took flight from the ground cover. No incident arose. However, this prompted me to consult my sectional and terminal area charts, and the location was verified as a National Wildlife Refuge. Always performing low altitude maneuvers [in this area] caused complacency in verifying compliance with airspace [regulations].
Flying daily in the Class B veil has taught me about airspace dimensions and locations, and ATC compliance and communication. Emphasis on these aspects caused me to overlook the airspace not specifically regulated by ATC or FAA regulations. Instructors are faced with a multitude of cockpit tasks, including setting a good example for the student. After this incident, the instructor reviewed his error with the student, and discussed the importance of interpreting chart symbology.
■ As I started to turn onto downwind, I felt a bump...as if the wheels struck an object. My wheel struck the glider’s canopy, and my right wing grazed the glider’s right wing. Both aircraft landed with minor damage.
Both glider pilots were looking for me. I could not see the glider beneath me turning onto downwind [at the same time I was]. I was not aware the glider was in the pattern. A Tower would have averted this incident, which was close to being a tragic accident. Actually, adherence to recommended safe operating procedures would have averted the incident. Descending to the traffic pattern altitude outside the normal pattern decreases the likelihood of descending onto another aircraft. In addition, the 45-degree entry to the downwind leg is helpful in sighting other aircraft in the pattern. In this incident, neither procedure was used.
Fouled Again
An instructor, highly experienced but low-time in type, found that being misinformed about one mechanical system led to several unpleasant surprises.
■ Training flight [at 2,000 feet MSL]. Slow flight. Dirty, then partial stall. The left engine quit when throttles retarded. Hydraulic pump is on that engine only. Therefore, flaps blew up but gear was stuck down. Barely made it back to airport on one engine. Five [attempted] restarts were un “suck”-cessful. Plugs were later found fouled...
This instructor also displayed questionable judgment in practicing stalls at 2,000 feet. A higher altitude is usually recommended and would have provided a safety buffer for stall training and practice of emergency procedures.
ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
Reported procedural problems with an ILS approach Allegedly defective cockpit seat latches on the B-737-500 Illegal Extended Range (ETOPS) routing of a jet by ATC Multiple electrical system malfunctions on a DC-10-10 Runaway rudder trim during takeoff of an Airbus 300-600R
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting
System,
P.O. Box 189,
Moffett Field, CA
94035-0189
May 1995 Report Intake
Air Carrier Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 1994 819 90 44
TOTAL
2947
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址:美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_194.pdf