Number 220
October 1997
Did You Say What I Heard?
Mandatory readback of certain parts of clearances provides a mechanism to reduce misunderstandings between ATC and flight crews. An ATC supervisor reports on a readback error that slipped by both him and an ATC trainee, with a potentially hazardous result.
s ATC was
s Aircraft A was given a descent from 8,000 feet to only 7,000 feet (6,000 feet would be the norm on this route). Pilot read back 6,000 feet, which was not caught by either of us. We tried to get him back to 7,000 feet, but he went to 6,500 before he climbed back. Aircraft B was one mile in trail at 6,000 feet, same speed.
A contributing factor was my over-reliance on the trainee, who is fairly well along in training. I was assuming he would catch the problem, so I was not listening as intently. Also, the [typical] descent from 8,000 to 6,000 feet probably had the pilot expecting to hear 6,000. Only goes to prove the importance of readbacks being heard and understood. Another controller reports that even when the readback of the clearance is correct, sometimes it’s the wrong aircraft doing the reading back.
holding about five aircraft. All were within five minutes of EFC (Expect Further Clearance) times. Air carrier flight ABC checked in on the frequency approaching the holding fix. ATC cleared [same company] flight BCD via the STAR. The readback sounded correct. Flight BCD then asked if that clearance was for him. ATC stated affirmative. Flight ABC was approaching EFC time, and mistakenly took BCD’s clearance. Flight ABC was given a safe altitude to maintain and reissued holding instructions. Flight BCD did the “heads up,” requested clarification, and kept ATC from having a very serious situation develop very quickly. We all get hurried on occasion. Kudos to the pilots out there for whom safety, not time, is the number one priority. Careful readbacks—and additional clarification, if necessary—are especially important for both pilots and controllers when aircraft with similar-sounding callsigns are on the frequency.
Airspace “Busts”
Turbulence and an unauthorized penetration of airspace may not seem obviously related. In two separate reports, however, turbulence, or rather, a pilot’s attempt to avoid it, led to an airspace “bust.” A corporate Captain explains:
s I departed in my 1941 open-cockpit bi-plane. This
airplane is fairly fast, and chart-folding is extremely difficult with the wind coming through the front cockpit and exiting through the rear cockpit [the PIC position]. The weather was MVFR and there was a SIGMET for severe turbulence. I climbed through a large hole in the clouds, and found moderate turbulence. As I tried to clip on my kneeboard with the chart attached, the aircraft lurched down hard, causing me to lose my grip on the kneeboard. The kneeboard and chart were sucked away. So then I had no chart for the area. I don’t strap the kneeboard on before takeoff because it restricts side-to-side movement of the control stick. I flew West for quite some time and thought I was well clear of the Class B airspace. But the wind was extremely strong out of the West, so I was still in the Class B airspace when I was forced up to 6,500 feet to maintain VFR. I couldn’t call Approach because I didn’t recall the frequency. I thought the floor of the outer ring was 8,000 feet, but it was only 6,000 feet, so I was in the bottom 500 feet of the Class B airspace. If pilots want to remain VFR while flying in MVFR conditions, they should be sure to maintain adequate backup navigation to verify they are clear of controlled airspace. August 1997 Report Intake
Air Carrier Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 1944 650 105 56
s We were at 15,500 feet on an IFR flight plan and were given a descent to 9,000 feet. The ceiling was called broken…cloud bases were at 8,500 feet with turbulence below. Since we were in familiar airspace, I decided to cancel IFR and proceed VFR, but stay with Center for VFR advisories. There were few holes to descend through, but I found one. To get through, I had to maneuver somewhat and I got a little closer to the Class B airspace than I anticipated. I noticed I was inside the 20-mile outer ring, and I climbed back to 7,500 feet to clear it. Center handed us off to Approach, and we proceeded to our destination without further incident.
My willingness to cancel my IFR flight plan was very poor decision-making on my part. Just to stay at a higher altitude and make the flight a little smoother, I ended up painting myself into a corner. I won’t do it again. Next, a general aviation (GA) pilot in a restored military trainer was also seeking a smoother ride when turbulence took away his chart and added a new wrinkle to the flight.
ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
An aileron cable failure on a B737-200 FMS map shifts resulting in an IFR missed approach Timeliness of Land-and-Hold-Short instructions by ATC A New Jersey SID generating 25 air carrier pilot complaints Severe control problems due to a wing crack on an EMB-120
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189 http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
TOTAL
2755
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_220.pdf
October 1997
Did You Say What I Heard?
Mandatory readback of certain parts of clearances provides a mechanism to reduce misunderstandings between ATC and flight crews. An ATC supervisor reports on a readback error that slipped by both him and an ATC trainee, with a potentially hazardous result.
s ATC was
s Aircraft A was given a descent from 8,000 feet to only 7,000 feet (6,000 feet would be the norm on this route). Pilot read back 6,000 feet, which was not caught by either of us. We tried to get him back to 7,000 feet, but he went to 6,500 before he climbed back. Aircraft B was one mile in trail at 6,000 feet, same speed.
A contributing factor was my over-reliance on the trainee, who is fairly well along in training. I was assuming he would catch the problem, so I was not listening as intently. Also, the [typical] descent from 8,000 to 6,000 feet probably had the pilot expecting to hear 6,000. Only goes to prove the importance of readbacks being heard and understood. Another controller reports that even when the readback of the clearance is correct, sometimes it’s the wrong aircraft doing the reading back.
holding about five aircraft. All were within five minutes of EFC (Expect Further Clearance) times. Air carrier flight ABC checked in on the frequency approaching the holding fix. ATC cleared [same company] flight BCD via the STAR. The readback sounded correct. Flight BCD then asked if that clearance was for him. ATC stated affirmative. Flight ABC was approaching EFC time, and mistakenly took BCD’s clearance. Flight ABC was given a safe altitude to maintain and reissued holding instructions. Flight BCD did the “heads up,” requested clarification, and kept ATC from having a very serious situation develop very quickly. We all get hurried on occasion. Kudos to the pilots out there for whom safety, not time, is the number one priority. Careful readbacks—and additional clarification, if necessary—are especially important for both pilots and controllers when aircraft with similar-sounding callsigns are on the frequency.
Airspace “Busts”
Turbulence and an unauthorized penetration of airspace may not seem obviously related. In two separate reports, however, turbulence, or rather, a pilot’s attempt to avoid it, led to an airspace “bust.” A corporate Captain explains:
s I departed in my 1941 open-cockpit bi-plane. This
airplane is fairly fast, and chart-folding is extremely difficult with the wind coming through the front cockpit and exiting through the rear cockpit [the PIC position]. The weather was MVFR and there was a SIGMET for severe turbulence. I climbed through a large hole in the clouds, and found moderate turbulence. As I tried to clip on my kneeboard with the chart attached, the aircraft lurched down hard, causing me to lose my grip on the kneeboard. The kneeboard and chart were sucked away. So then I had no chart for the area. I don’t strap the kneeboard on before takeoff because it restricts side-to-side movement of the control stick. I flew West for quite some time and thought I was well clear of the Class B airspace. But the wind was extremely strong out of the West, so I was still in the Class B airspace when I was forced up to 6,500 feet to maintain VFR. I couldn’t call Approach because I didn’t recall the frequency. I thought the floor of the outer ring was 8,000 feet, but it was only 6,000 feet, so I was in the bottom 500 feet of the Class B airspace. If pilots want to remain VFR while flying in MVFR conditions, they should be sure to maintain adequate backup navigation to verify they are clear of controlled airspace. August 1997 Report Intake
Air Carrier Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 1944 650 105 56
s We were at 15,500 feet on an IFR flight plan and were given a descent to 9,000 feet. The ceiling was called broken…cloud bases were at 8,500 feet with turbulence below. Since we were in familiar airspace, I decided to cancel IFR and proceed VFR, but stay with Center for VFR advisories. There were few holes to descend through, but I found one. To get through, I had to maneuver somewhat and I got a little closer to the Class B airspace than I anticipated. I noticed I was inside the 20-mile outer ring, and I climbed back to 7,500 feet to clear it. Center handed us off to Approach, and we proceeded to our destination without further incident.
My willingness to cancel my IFR flight plan was very poor decision-making on my part. Just to stay at a higher altitude and make the flight a little smoother, I ended up painting myself into a corner. I won’t do it again. Next, a general aviation (GA) pilot in a restored military trainer was also seeking a smoother ride when turbulence took away his chart and added a new wrinkle to the flight.
ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
An aileron cable failure on a B737-200 FMS map shifts resulting in an IFR missed approach Timeliness of Land-and-Hold-Short instructions by ATC A New Jersey SID generating 25 air carrier pilot complaints Severe control problems due to a wing crack on an EMB-120
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189 http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
TOTAL
2755
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_220.pdf
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