Number 222
December 1997
Weighty Decisions
Pilots sometimes take weight and balance matters for granted, especially with a familiar aircraft or an “average” payload. A general aviation pilot, overestimating the aircraft’s performance and underestimating the passenger load, reports on the effects of an overweight takeoff in a six-place airplane: The reporter’s point is relevant to both the previous report and this incident: the use of “average” weights for passengers, luggage, and carry-on items can lead to gross inaccuracies in calculating gross weight.
s Accelerated to full power, 10 degrees flaps, and rotated at 70 knots. Pulled gear up at approximately 10-15 feet in the air. Sank into the ground at full power, in effect a gear-up landing. After the incident, the aircraft contents were weighed, and actual weight was such that the aircraft was 150 lbs. over gross. I had previously removed the two rear seats, and had estimated the weights.
Clearly, I should have weighed each of my passengers and their bags. Also, I only guessed about the amount of weight savings that removing the two rear seats would produce. Pilots also need to consider the trade-off between the performance gained by “cleaning up” the aircraft immediately after takeoff versus the safety of leaving the gear in place until there is no longer a chance of the aircraft settling back onto the runway. Additionally, on some aircraft the gear doors open to allow gear retraction; this temporarily increases drag and decreases lift, reducing aircraft performance.
Hurry Up and Weight
In the rush for a quick departure, this air carrier crew apparently overlooked the takeoff weight limitation for their assigned runway. The First Officer reports:
s After pushback, we began to taxi and the Captain elected
to shut down one engine to conserve fuel. It turned out to be a short taxi, so he instructed me to restart the engine. There was not much time between checklist, taxi instructions, and watching for traffic and taxiways at this busy airport. The flap and power settings for our calculated takeoff weight are printed on the Automated Weight and Balance that the computer generates. I selected and informed the Captain of the flap setting and power required, but failed to notice that the performance criteria were designated for Runway 4R and we were cleared for Runway 4L, which is considerably shorter. On takeoff roll, it was somewhat evident that the end of the runway was coming up fast. We departed without incident, and realized the mistake while enroute. Neither of us had checked the runway that the takeoff weights were predicated on. We were 10,000 lbs. overweight on our departure. When faced with schedule pressures or other time-related constraints, flight crews need to take an extra moment to ensure that potentially critical information does not pass unnoticed.
The Bod Squad
Air carrier crews can find their aircraft overloaded when cabin weights are incorrectly calculated—or estimated— by company dispatch. A Captain tells of the flight of his “heavy” aircraft, a B-727 laden with a football team.
s The aircraft papers indicated that the aircraft would be
just 100 lbs. or so below its maximum structural gross weight for takeoff. Takeoff was done with an abnormally long ground roll, and climb performance was marginal both dirty and cleaned up. Flight was planned for FL310. At about FL260, rate of climb was less than 500 feet per minute. The aircraft could not make it to FL310 and stayed at FL260. When I rechecked the weight and balance, I saw that we had 100 passengers, and that “normal” passenger-plus-carry-on weight of 212 lbs. was used to calculate cabin weight. I watched these guys disembark; they are gigantic, and all carried very large equipment duffel bags. I think the aircraft was a good 8,000-10,000 lbs. over planned weight, and far in excess of structural gross weight. Abnormal passenger loads—troops, football teams, sumo wrestlers, etc.—should require actual weights for dispatch. ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
Inflight speed brake failure on an FK-10 EMB-120 inflight engine cowling openings B757 inflight fuel loss due to a hole in a fuel line Sabreliner 65 engine failure due to gear door separation Blending of a Nevada airport's background and PLASI lights
Keep The Big Picture
An air carrier pilot provides a final thought:
s Each trip I gain some sort of new experience.
Isn’t that what makes flying great? Fly the airplane. Keep the big picture. Think ahead. Don’t rush your thinking. Use your crew as a team. Lead the team. And read CALLBACK, of course!
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189 http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
October 1997 Report Intake
Air Carrier Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 1988 724 119 50
TOTAL
2881
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_222.pdf
December 1997
Weighty Decisions
Pilots sometimes take weight and balance matters for granted, especially with a familiar aircraft or an “average” payload. A general aviation pilot, overestimating the aircraft’s performance and underestimating the passenger load, reports on the effects of an overweight takeoff in a six-place airplane: The reporter’s point is relevant to both the previous report and this incident: the use of “average” weights for passengers, luggage, and carry-on items can lead to gross inaccuracies in calculating gross weight.
s Accelerated to full power, 10 degrees flaps, and rotated at 70 knots. Pulled gear up at approximately 10-15 feet in the air. Sank into the ground at full power, in effect a gear-up landing. After the incident, the aircraft contents were weighed, and actual weight was such that the aircraft was 150 lbs. over gross. I had previously removed the two rear seats, and had estimated the weights.
Clearly, I should have weighed each of my passengers and their bags. Also, I only guessed about the amount of weight savings that removing the two rear seats would produce. Pilots also need to consider the trade-off between the performance gained by “cleaning up” the aircraft immediately after takeoff versus the safety of leaving the gear in place until there is no longer a chance of the aircraft settling back onto the runway. Additionally, on some aircraft the gear doors open to allow gear retraction; this temporarily increases drag and decreases lift, reducing aircraft performance.
Hurry Up and Weight
In the rush for a quick departure, this air carrier crew apparently overlooked the takeoff weight limitation for their assigned runway. The First Officer reports:
s After pushback, we began to taxi and the Captain elected
to shut down one engine to conserve fuel. It turned out to be a short taxi, so he instructed me to restart the engine. There was not much time between checklist, taxi instructions, and watching for traffic and taxiways at this busy airport. The flap and power settings for our calculated takeoff weight are printed on the Automated Weight and Balance that the computer generates. I selected and informed the Captain of the flap setting and power required, but failed to notice that the performance criteria were designated for Runway 4R and we were cleared for Runway 4L, which is considerably shorter. On takeoff roll, it was somewhat evident that the end of the runway was coming up fast. We departed without incident, and realized the mistake while enroute. Neither of us had checked the runway that the takeoff weights were predicated on. We were 10,000 lbs. overweight on our departure. When faced with schedule pressures or other time-related constraints, flight crews need to take an extra moment to ensure that potentially critical information does not pass unnoticed.
The Bod Squad
Air carrier crews can find their aircraft overloaded when cabin weights are incorrectly calculated—or estimated— by company dispatch. A Captain tells of the flight of his “heavy” aircraft, a B-727 laden with a football team.
s The aircraft papers indicated that the aircraft would be
just 100 lbs. or so below its maximum structural gross weight for takeoff. Takeoff was done with an abnormally long ground roll, and climb performance was marginal both dirty and cleaned up. Flight was planned for FL310. At about FL260, rate of climb was less than 500 feet per minute. The aircraft could not make it to FL310 and stayed at FL260. When I rechecked the weight and balance, I saw that we had 100 passengers, and that “normal” passenger-plus-carry-on weight of 212 lbs. was used to calculate cabin weight. I watched these guys disembark; they are gigantic, and all carried very large equipment duffel bags. I think the aircraft was a good 8,000-10,000 lbs. over planned weight, and far in excess of structural gross weight. Abnormal passenger loads—troops, football teams, sumo wrestlers, etc.—should require actual weights for dispatch. ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
Inflight speed brake failure on an FK-10 EMB-120 inflight engine cowling openings B757 inflight fuel loss due to a hole in a fuel line Sabreliner 65 engine failure due to gear door separation Blending of a Nevada airport's background and PLASI lights
Keep The Big Picture
An air carrier pilot provides a final thought:
s Each trip I gain some sort of new experience.
Isn’t that what makes flying great? Fly the airplane. Keep the big picture. Think ahead. Don’t rush your thinking. Use your crew as a team. Lead the team. And read CALLBACK, of course!
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189 http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
October 1997 Report Intake
Air Carrier Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 1988 724 119 50
TOTAL
2881
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_222.pdf
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