Number 243
September 1999
Taking a Stand for Safety
Some of the most difficult judgment calls in aviation occur on the ground, before a flight. Pressured by schedule, passengers, and other considerations, pilots may be tempted to suspend the good judgment they have gained from experience and training to undertake questionable or unsafe flights. We hear from several pilots who explain to ASRS why they regretted not taking a stand for safety. From a new-hire corporate First Officer: However, the Captain was still unwilling to purchase the fuel… I am new with this company and was afraid to make waves with my boss as he has a poor record with pilot personnel. I should have made a stand and deplaned the aircraft, but did not. We landed with about 35 minutes of fuel at our destination after shooting an ILS to 500 feet and 1-1/4 mile visibility… I made contact with his superiors and informed [them] of the event. They assured me that they would stand behind me in all situations of this nature… and also informed me that this will not happen again... I have learned that I should and will take whatever actions [are] necessary to avoid putting my certificate…the passengers’ safety or the aircraft in jeopardy.
s The Captain [who was] also Chief Pilot…would not put on more fuel at my request. We both were aware of the forecast conditions at our destination, and were both also aware that these conditions required additional fuel to be added to remain within legal IFR reserve fuel minimums.
Canyon Calisthenics
The next incident, recounted by the pilot of a high-performance single-engine aircraft, made white-knuckle flyers out of several veteran pilots. It occurred just after a routine passenger pick-up at an airport in the West whose elevation is almost 4,000 feet AGL.
s The incident began at [an] airport on [the] lake. I was part of a group of five similar airplanes there to pick up a group of river rafters… The load I was given was five men, two of them quite large, and quite a lot of baggage. There were no scales in the plane so there was no way to know exactly what the load was. However, it was clear that it came very close to max weight. I refused some of the bags and put them aboard another plane. I loaded up the passengers and proceeded to depart. The takeoff was normal and although I could feel the weight of the plane, it did climb out normally.
The weather was hot with high winds and turbulence as is usual for this location. There were also updrafts and downdrafts. On climb-out I flew into one of these downdrafts and the plane began to sink. I was flying over the river which has steep canyon walls. In this downdraft I could not climb out of the canyon. I knew that eventually the downdraft would abate and I could climb out, but my
passengers were beginning to panic. Two of them were pilots themselves. The passenger sitting behind me took the initiative without my orders to open the pilot-side door and throw out all the bags into the river below, a load of perhaps 150 pounds. I did not resist this move as to do so may have increased their panic. Eventually the downdraft abated and the plane climbed out of the canyon and up to a safe altitude, then landed safely. In retrospect I believe there are a number of ways the incident could have been avoided. I could have been more conservative on the load and refused more bags… I was over-confident about the capabilities of the plane. Also, unconsciously I was relying on the judgment of two of the other pilots present… Both of these pilots had much more experience at this location than I did. I could also have…allowed for the possibility of downdrafts. It’s possible that the open aircraft door and resultant drag worsened the downdraft situation. Our reporter might have prevented the passenger panic and subsequent baggage barrage by briefing on the local flight conditions prior to departure.
Flying Outside the Book
And from a pilot who was persuaded by a company salesman to bend weight-and-balance rules to sew up a sale:
s …The salesman, myself, and the [new aircraft] owner were flying [on a long cross-country]. With 3 people and full fuel this aircraft is approximately 50 pounds over gross takeoff weight. We departed with an additional 8 bags and one set of golf clubs, which clearly put us over gross weight. I know better, but rationalizing the ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On…
MD-80 autospoiler malfunction A camcorder battery fire in an overhead cabin bin B737-800 leading edge devices malfunction Unshielded transponder testing at an airport repair facility Alleged navigation interference by a passenger DVD player
salesman’s statement, “I fly with 5 people and full fuel…and it is fine,” I proceeded… When I had the plane at approximately 400 feet AGL I ran out of nose-down elevator trim. I called Tower and requested that we come around to land… This was my first experience outside of the college training environment which consists of good habit patterns and flying by the book. Unfortunately, I did not follow good judgment. Upon my return, I told the salesman he needed to get someone else.
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from
The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189 http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
July 1999 Report Intake
Air Carrier / Air Taxi Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other TOTAL 2078 729 65 166 3038
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_243.pdf
September 1999
Taking a Stand for Safety
Some of the most difficult judgment calls in aviation occur on the ground, before a flight. Pressured by schedule, passengers, and other considerations, pilots may be tempted to suspend the good judgment they have gained from experience and training to undertake questionable or unsafe flights. We hear from several pilots who explain to ASRS why they regretted not taking a stand for safety. From a new-hire corporate First Officer: However, the Captain was still unwilling to purchase the fuel… I am new with this company and was afraid to make waves with my boss as he has a poor record with pilot personnel. I should have made a stand and deplaned the aircraft, but did not. We landed with about 35 minutes of fuel at our destination after shooting an ILS to 500 feet and 1-1/4 mile visibility… I made contact with his superiors and informed [them] of the event. They assured me that they would stand behind me in all situations of this nature… and also informed me that this will not happen again... I have learned that I should and will take whatever actions [are] necessary to avoid putting my certificate…the passengers’ safety or the aircraft in jeopardy.
s The Captain [who was] also Chief Pilot…would not put on more fuel at my request. We both were aware of the forecast conditions at our destination, and were both also aware that these conditions required additional fuel to be added to remain within legal IFR reserve fuel minimums.
Canyon Calisthenics
The next incident, recounted by the pilot of a high-performance single-engine aircraft, made white-knuckle flyers out of several veteran pilots. It occurred just after a routine passenger pick-up at an airport in the West whose elevation is almost 4,000 feet AGL.
s The incident began at [an] airport on [the] lake. I was part of a group of five similar airplanes there to pick up a group of river rafters… The load I was given was five men, two of them quite large, and quite a lot of baggage. There were no scales in the plane so there was no way to know exactly what the load was. However, it was clear that it came very close to max weight. I refused some of the bags and put them aboard another plane. I loaded up the passengers and proceeded to depart. The takeoff was normal and although I could feel the weight of the plane, it did climb out normally.
The weather was hot with high winds and turbulence as is usual for this location. There were also updrafts and downdrafts. On climb-out I flew into one of these downdrafts and the plane began to sink. I was flying over the river which has steep canyon walls. In this downdraft I could not climb out of the canyon. I knew that eventually the downdraft would abate and I could climb out, but my
passengers were beginning to panic. Two of them were pilots themselves. The passenger sitting behind me took the initiative without my orders to open the pilot-side door and throw out all the bags into the river below, a load of perhaps 150 pounds. I did not resist this move as to do so may have increased their panic. Eventually the downdraft abated and the plane climbed out of the canyon and up to a safe altitude, then landed safely. In retrospect I believe there are a number of ways the incident could have been avoided. I could have been more conservative on the load and refused more bags… I was over-confident about the capabilities of the plane. Also, unconsciously I was relying on the judgment of two of the other pilots present… Both of these pilots had much more experience at this location than I did. I could also have…allowed for the possibility of downdrafts. It’s possible that the open aircraft door and resultant drag worsened the downdraft situation. Our reporter might have prevented the passenger panic and subsequent baggage barrage by briefing on the local flight conditions prior to departure.
Flying Outside the Book
And from a pilot who was persuaded by a company salesman to bend weight-and-balance rules to sew up a sale:
s …The salesman, myself, and the [new aircraft] owner were flying [on a long cross-country]. With 3 people and full fuel this aircraft is approximately 50 pounds over gross takeoff weight. We departed with an additional 8 bags and one set of golf clubs, which clearly put us over gross weight. I know better, but rationalizing the ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On…
MD-80 autospoiler malfunction A camcorder battery fire in an overhead cabin bin B737-800 leading edge devices malfunction Unshielded transponder testing at an airport repair facility Alleged navigation interference by a passenger DVD player
salesman’s statement, “I fly with 5 people and full fuel…and it is fine,” I proceeded… When I had the plane at approximately 400 feet AGL I ran out of nose-down elevator trim. I called Tower and requested that we come around to land… This was my first experience outside of the college training environment which consists of good habit patterns and flying by the book. Unfortunately, I did not follow good judgment. Upon my return, I told the salesman he needed to get someone else.
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from
The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189 http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
July 1999 Report Intake
Air Carrier / Air Taxi Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other TOTAL 2078 729 65 166 3038
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_243.pdf
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