Number 231
September 1998
Intersection Interactions
Some recent ASRS reports show that runway transgressions are often the result of confusion about taxi instructions at runway/taxiway intersections. In a report from a corporate aircraft First Officer, time pressure helped to fuel the misunderstanding:
Construction Zone
A report from a Local (Tower) Controller points out the increased runway/taxiway confusion that can result during airport construction activities.
s The problem arose when we became rushed and
distracted by our eight-minute time limit to make our takeoff slot for flow control. The controller instructed me to cross the runway at Taxiway X, taxi the full length of Runway 07, and hold short. I misunderstood the taxi instructions. I taxied onto active Runway 07, and proceeded to back-taxi down the runway to turn around and hold awaiting further takeoff instructions. What we really should have done was cross Runway 07, taxi on the parallel taxiway, and hold short at the end of the runway. The controller questioned my actions, and told us to taxi down and clear the runway immediately. As we were leaving the runway, I saw an aircraft that I believe the Tower had sent around. The instruction to “cross the runway at Taxiway X” should have been a heads-up to the crew not to taxi onto the runway. In a callback conversation with an ASRS analyst, the reporter stated that in the future, the flight crew will verify any clearance to taxi onto a runway. Absence of definitive ATC instructions lured another corporate flight crew into a runway transgression. The First Officer reports:
s Ground Control requested to cross a small airplane at the
departure end of Runway 31. I approved it. This is a nonstandard operation due to the main taxiway being closed for construction. The airplane pilot turned onto the runway instead of crossing it as instructed. He observed a jet turning onto Runway 31 [for departure]. He moved over to the edge of the runway, but never said anything. The color of the aircraft and its position were such that it blended in with the runway paint. I cleared the jet for takeoff, then observed the airplane just prior to the jet rotating. After the jet passed over the airplane, the airplane pilot asked Ground Control if he was in the right place. In a subsequent conversation with the controller, the pilot indicated that he was unaware that there was a parallel taxiway available, and so turned onto the active runway. When airport construction or any other unusual activity renders runway and taxiway operations non-standard, both pilots and controllers need to use extra caution to ensure that taxi instructions are clearly understood and followed. Pilots can give themselves an edge by having airport diagrams close at hand to confirm taxi routes.
s We were cleared to land Runway 30. No “hold short of Runway 20” or anything. On rollout, we were not given any taxi-off instructions because Tower was busy with someone who was having radio problems. I believed there was some traffic landing behind us, and I thought we should clear the runway as soon as possible because that’s what you are supposed to do. We taxied clear of Runway 30 by turning onto Runway 02/20, and stopped awaiting further ATC instructions. The controller told us in the future not to taxi onto another runway because it messes up his separation.
In the landing clearance, the absence of a “hold short” instruction was not permission for the flight crew to enter Runway 20 and stop there. In this case, there were intersecting taxiways shortly before and beyond the intersection with Runway 20 which could have provided appropriate turn-offs. The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) states that pilots should exit the runway at the first available taxiway or as instructed by ATC. The AIM Section 4-3-20 offers additional information on exiting the runway after landing.
ELT Interference
A situation commonly associated with GA pilots —an ELT false alarm—became a serious distraction to a commuter flight crew. The First Officer reports:
s From first contact with Ground Control until landing ...the ELT signal could be heard strongly on all frequencies. The sound was so loud that it was hard to hear and understand any ATC transmissions. The Captain elected to continue the flight. After landing, I climbed into the rear baggage compartment and found a box jammed into the ELT. After removing the box and resetting the ELT, the signal stopped. In the future, I would suggest stopping the aircraft and checking to see if it was my ELT.
Pilots’ quick responses to an ELT signal can save ATC and the Civil Air Patrol from scrambling to a false alarm, as well as save other pilots the frustration of trying to communicate over the sound of a transmitting ELT. The reporter does not indicate what, if any, repercussions resulted from this noisy flight.
ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
Uncommanded disengagement of an EMB-145 autopilot SAAB 340 brake failure attributed to a broken hydraulic line DC-10 engine flameout attributed to the wake of a preceding jet Reporters' advocacy of TCAS II equipment in cargo aircraft SID-created traffic conflicts between two adjacent airports
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189
http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
July 1998 Report Intake
Air Carrier Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 2145 832 79 161
TOTAL
3217
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_231.pdf
September 1998
Intersection Interactions
Some recent ASRS reports show that runway transgressions are often the result of confusion about taxi instructions at runway/taxiway intersections. In a report from a corporate aircraft First Officer, time pressure helped to fuel the misunderstanding:
Construction Zone
A report from a Local (Tower) Controller points out the increased runway/taxiway confusion that can result during airport construction activities.
s The problem arose when we became rushed and
distracted by our eight-minute time limit to make our takeoff slot for flow control. The controller instructed me to cross the runway at Taxiway X, taxi the full length of Runway 07, and hold short. I misunderstood the taxi instructions. I taxied onto active Runway 07, and proceeded to back-taxi down the runway to turn around and hold awaiting further takeoff instructions. What we really should have done was cross Runway 07, taxi on the parallel taxiway, and hold short at the end of the runway. The controller questioned my actions, and told us to taxi down and clear the runway immediately. As we were leaving the runway, I saw an aircraft that I believe the Tower had sent around. The instruction to “cross the runway at Taxiway X” should have been a heads-up to the crew not to taxi onto the runway. In a callback conversation with an ASRS analyst, the reporter stated that in the future, the flight crew will verify any clearance to taxi onto a runway. Absence of definitive ATC instructions lured another corporate flight crew into a runway transgression. The First Officer reports:
s Ground Control requested to cross a small airplane at the
departure end of Runway 31. I approved it. This is a nonstandard operation due to the main taxiway being closed for construction. The airplane pilot turned onto the runway instead of crossing it as instructed. He observed a jet turning onto Runway 31 [for departure]. He moved over to the edge of the runway, but never said anything. The color of the aircraft and its position were such that it blended in with the runway paint. I cleared the jet for takeoff, then observed the airplane just prior to the jet rotating. After the jet passed over the airplane, the airplane pilot asked Ground Control if he was in the right place. In a subsequent conversation with the controller, the pilot indicated that he was unaware that there was a parallel taxiway available, and so turned onto the active runway. When airport construction or any other unusual activity renders runway and taxiway operations non-standard, both pilots and controllers need to use extra caution to ensure that taxi instructions are clearly understood and followed. Pilots can give themselves an edge by having airport diagrams close at hand to confirm taxi routes.
s We were cleared to land Runway 30. No “hold short of Runway 20” or anything. On rollout, we were not given any taxi-off instructions because Tower was busy with someone who was having radio problems. I believed there was some traffic landing behind us, and I thought we should clear the runway as soon as possible because that’s what you are supposed to do. We taxied clear of Runway 30 by turning onto Runway 02/20, and stopped awaiting further ATC instructions. The controller told us in the future not to taxi onto another runway because it messes up his separation.
In the landing clearance, the absence of a “hold short” instruction was not permission for the flight crew to enter Runway 20 and stop there. In this case, there were intersecting taxiways shortly before and beyond the intersection with Runway 20 which could have provided appropriate turn-offs. The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) states that pilots should exit the runway at the first available taxiway or as instructed by ATC. The AIM Section 4-3-20 offers additional information on exiting the runway after landing.
ELT Interference
A situation commonly associated with GA pilots —an ELT false alarm—became a serious distraction to a commuter flight crew. The First Officer reports:
s From first contact with Ground Control until landing ...the ELT signal could be heard strongly on all frequencies. The sound was so loud that it was hard to hear and understand any ATC transmissions. The Captain elected to continue the flight. After landing, I climbed into the rear baggage compartment and found a box jammed into the ELT. After removing the box and resetting the ELT, the signal stopped. In the future, I would suggest stopping the aircraft and checking to see if it was my ELT.
Pilots’ quick responses to an ELT signal can save ATC and the Civil Air Patrol from scrambling to a false alarm, as well as save other pilots the frustration of trying to communicate over the sound of a transmitting ELT. The reporter does not indicate what, if any, repercussions resulted from this noisy flight.
ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
Uncommanded disengagement of an EMB-145 autopilot SAAB 340 brake failure attributed to a broken hydraulic line DC-10 engine flameout attributed to the wake of a preceding jet Reporters' advocacy of TCAS II equipment in cargo aircraft SID-created traffic conflicts between two adjacent airports
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189
http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
July 1998 Report Intake
Air Carrier Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 2145 832 79 161
TOTAL
3217
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_231.pdf
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