Number 232
October 1998
Gear Pin Roulette
Pins left installed in an aircraft’s landing gear seem to be a thorn in the side of pilots and mechanics alike. Many ASRS reporters have noted that long streamers or REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT flags attached to the pins are a helpful reminder for both flight and ground crews to check for the presence of landing gear pins. However, the absence of flags in the wheel well area is no guarantee that the gear will retract on command, as a DC-10-30 mechanic discovered: DC-10s have only three gear pins, but the DC-10-30 has four. An aircraft’s checklists for both maintenance and flight crews need to be specific enough to indicate the correct number of gear pins used on that particular model and series. Another air carrier flight crew had all the flags visible and properly stowed in the cockpit as they were supposed to be—and were surprised when their landing gear would not retract. The Captain reports:
s Center gear pin [on a DC-10-30 was not] removed before
flight. There was no log page entry of center pin being installed, and no flag or streamer was visible from the ground. In the air, the center gear failed to retract. Maintenance Control asked the crew how many gear pins they had on board—three, as per…a normal DC-10 checklist. The flight crew failed to count four pins [as are normal for a DC-10-30]. The mechanic who removed the gear pins failed to count in the pouch the fourth pin. I suggest a separate write-up when the center gear pin is installed on a DC-10-30. A number of other ASRS reporters, both pilots and mechanics, have admitted to overlooking this important detail associated with the DC-10-30 series aircraft: most
s After takeoff, we attempted to retract the gear, but the
mains stayed down and locked. We checked all the related systems and found no apparent problems, so we returned to the airport. We found the main gear pins installed. We learned later that the aircraft had been ferried here with the gear down, the pins installed, and the flags removed. When I did my preflight of the cockpit, I noted that all the flags were behind the First Officer’s seat, per the Company Manual. It never came to mind that the mechanics had removed the flags from the pins. The Captain’s future preflight plans no doubt will include looking specifically for gear pins attached to those carefully stowed flags!
Wheel of Misfortune
A pilot began this report to ASRS quite succinctly: “Upon completion of a very short flight, it was determined that the aileron controls were rigged backward.” Fortunately, that “very short flight” only got about 30 feet off the ground. The cause of the incident became obvious to the reporter, a manufacturer’s test pilot, upon reflection. the control wheel from the exterior of the aircraft. I did a control wheel check in the hangar and again prior to flight. I did use the checklist. I do recall seeing left aileron movement. I am unable to see the right [aileron] from the left seat. My mistake was that I “looked,” but did not “see” (notice) the incorrect aileron movement. The incorrect direction did not register in my mind. This was a classic example of seeing what was expected— normal aileron movement—not the reality of the reversed aileron controls.
s I was sent to functional check the aircraft after maintenance. I did a preflight in the hangar, where aileron movement and proper attachment were examined. I am unable to see
“Smoking Rivets”
In mechanic’s parlance, a “smoking rivet” is a loose or working rivet whose vibration causes a black streak trailing aft. Smoking rivets may be acceptable for continued service for short periods of time under the limited conditions outlined in the aircraft’s Structural Repair Manual (SRM). The trick seems to be digging deep enough into all the footnotes in the SRM to determine exactly what the limitations are, as an air carrier Maintenance Controller reports: and make an interim repair. The time limit was 25 hours for [final] repair. While researching a similar problem [later], I found a reference that states the [deferral] does not apply to the aileron trim tabs. The foreman either did not see the note or missed the limitations of damage to trim tabs. Maintenance personnel must ensure that they are looking at the appropriate section of the SRM for the exact problem being researched. Careful reading of all limitations and instructions—including footnotes—should prevent misinterpretation of the corrective action.
s The foreman called for the deferral of a working rivet
and edge delamination on the aileron trim tab. The foreman stated that the rivet was smoking and delamination was within limits per the SRM for deferral for repair. I instructed the foreman to verify the limits ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
A reported antenna hazard near a Texas airport An MD-80 go-around caused by a taxiing MD-11's jet blast Incorrect MEL procedure for a BAE-41 yaw damper malfunction B-747 jetway collision due to faulty docking guidance system Converging ILS/missed approach paths at a Colorado airport
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189
http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
August 1998 Report Intake
Air Carrier Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 1859 827 87 176
TOTAL
2949
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_232.pdf
October 1998
Gear Pin Roulette
Pins left installed in an aircraft’s landing gear seem to be a thorn in the side of pilots and mechanics alike. Many ASRS reporters have noted that long streamers or REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT flags attached to the pins are a helpful reminder for both flight and ground crews to check for the presence of landing gear pins. However, the absence of flags in the wheel well area is no guarantee that the gear will retract on command, as a DC-10-30 mechanic discovered: DC-10s have only three gear pins, but the DC-10-30 has four. An aircraft’s checklists for both maintenance and flight crews need to be specific enough to indicate the correct number of gear pins used on that particular model and series. Another air carrier flight crew had all the flags visible and properly stowed in the cockpit as they were supposed to be—and were surprised when their landing gear would not retract. The Captain reports:
s Center gear pin [on a DC-10-30 was not] removed before
flight. There was no log page entry of center pin being installed, and no flag or streamer was visible from the ground. In the air, the center gear failed to retract. Maintenance Control asked the crew how many gear pins they had on board—three, as per…a normal DC-10 checklist. The flight crew failed to count four pins [as are normal for a DC-10-30]. The mechanic who removed the gear pins failed to count in the pouch the fourth pin. I suggest a separate write-up when the center gear pin is installed on a DC-10-30. A number of other ASRS reporters, both pilots and mechanics, have admitted to overlooking this important detail associated with the DC-10-30 series aircraft: most
s After takeoff, we attempted to retract the gear, but the
mains stayed down and locked. We checked all the related systems and found no apparent problems, so we returned to the airport. We found the main gear pins installed. We learned later that the aircraft had been ferried here with the gear down, the pins installed, and the flags removed. When I did my preflight of the cockpit, I noted that all the flags were behind the First Officer’s seat, per the Company Manual. It never came to mind that the mechanics had removed the flags from the pins. The Captain’s future preflight plans no doubt will include looking specifically for gear pins attached to those carefully stowed flags!
Wheel of Misfortune
A pilot began this report to ASRS quite succinctly: “Upon completion of a very short flight, it was determined that the aileron controls were rigged backward.” Fortunately, that “very short flight” only got about 30 feet off the ground. The cause of the incident became obvious to the reporter, a manufacturer’s test pilot, upon reflection. the control wheel from the exterior of the aircraft. I did a control wheel check in the hangar and again prior to flight. I did use the checklist. I do recall seeing left aileron movement. I am unable to see the right [aileron] from the left seat. My mistake was that I “looked,” but did not “see” (notice) the incorrect aileron movement. The incorrect direction did not register in my mind. This was a classic example of seeing what was expected— normal aileron movement—not the reality of the reversed aileron controls.
s I was sent to functional check the aircraft after maintenance. I did a preflight in the hangar, where aileron movement and proper attachment were examined. I am unable to see
“Smoking Rivets”
In mechanic’s parlance, a “smoking rivet” is a loose or working rivet whose vibration causes a black streak trailing aft. Smoking rivets may be acceptable for continued service for short periods of time under the limited conditions outlined in the aircraft’s Structural Repair Manual (SRM). The trick seems to be digging deep enough into all the footnotes in the SRM to determine exactly what the limitations are, as an air carrier Maintenance Controller reports: and make an interim repair. The time limit was 25 hours for [final] repair. While researching a similar problem [later], I found a reference that states the [deferral] does not apply to the aileron trim tabs. The foreman either did not see the note or missed the limitations of damage to trim tabs. Maintenance personnel must ensure that they are looking at the appropriate section of the SRM for the exact problem being researched. Careful reading of all limitations and instructions—including footnotes—should prevent misinterpretation of the corrective action.
s The foreman called for the deferral of a working rivet
and edge delamination on the aileron trim tab. The foreman stated that the rivet was smoking and delamination was within limits per the SRM for deferral for repair. I instructed the foreman to verify the limits ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
A reported antenna hazard near a Texas airport An MD-80 go-around caused by a taxiing MD-11's jet blast Incorrect MEL procedure for a BAE-41 yaw damper malfunction B-747 jetway collision due to faulty docking guidance system Converging ILS/missed approach paths at a Colorado airport
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189
http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
August 1998 Report Intake
Air Carrier Pilots General Aviation Pilots Controllers Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 1859 827 87 176
TOTAL
2949
飞行翻译公司 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：美国ASRS安全公告CALLBACK cb_232.pdf
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